On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis by Andrea Morone et al.
Università degli Studi di Bari
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi
Matematici
Southern Europe Research in Economic Studies
S.E.R.I.E.S.
SERIES e MATEF sono pubblicati a cura del Dipartimento di Scienze
economiche dell'Università degli Studi di Bari.
I lavori riflettono esclusivamente le opinioni degli autori e non
impegnano la responsabilità del Dipartimento.
SERIES e MATEF vogliono promuovere la circolazione di studi ancora
preliminari e incompleti, per suscitare commenti critici e
suggerimenti.
Si richiede di tener conto della natura provvisoria dei lavori per
eventuali citazioni o per ogni altro uso.
SERIES and MATEF are published under the auspices of the
Department of Economics of the University of Bari.
Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not
those of the Department.
Often SERIES and MATEF divulge preliminary or incomplete work,
circulated to favor discussion and comment.
Citation and use of these paper should consider their provisional
character.
WORKING PAPER NO.
Andrea Morone, Serena Sandri and Tobias Uske
On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
0017On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory
A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis∗
Andrea Morone† Serena Sandri‡ Tobias Uske§
December 2006
Abstract
Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972)
and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether
a theory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria
according to the assumptions on which they are based, the problem if theories are
absorbable by at most boundedly rational decision makers is hardly discussed. Based
on guessing game experiments we discuss the requirements of equilibrium theory ab-
sorption and test experimentally the eﬀects of informing none, some or all players
about how to derive equilibrium predictions.
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The concept of “theory absorption” points at the recursive eﬀects economic theories may
have on the system they aim at describing. Although potentially any economic theory can
be absorbed for the resolution of a concrete problem (Dacey (1976)), the way a theory
gets absorbed may diﬀer from case to case, depending on its formulation, its accessibility,
its understanding, and its acceptance by the individuals (Morgenstern (1972)). Adding to
that, past experiences and learning may matter as well.
When theories of decision behaviour with and without strategic interaction become more
widely accepted they will be used to predict others’ behaviour. A theory is said to be
absorbed by an individual if that individual refers to it for elaborating her own mental
models and chooses to act according to its logical content. In interactive contexts, theory
absorption will also be strongly related to the supposed behaviors of the others. Thus, it can
be distinguished among unilaterally-, partially-, and fully-absorbable theories, depending
on the number of individuals from one to all who follow its prescriptions and are satisﬁed
with the result, so that, ceteris paribus, there would not be any reason for the individuals
to modify the theory to adhere with, in other words the theory to absorb (Güth and Kliemt
(2004)). Thus, a theory is fully absorbable if such prediction does not question the validity
of the theory to predict.
Such absorbability holds for strategic equilibria (Cournot (1838), Nash (1951)) by def-
inition. When expecting a given equilibrium, it is optimal to behave accordingly. For
behavioural theories absorbability may not be granted. In bilateral negotiations such a
theory could, for instance, predict an agreement at the mean of the initial demands what
conﬁrms with some intuition and empirical observations (Pruitt (1981), Sebenius (1992)).
This, however, would inspire outrageous initial demands to which the theory, in all likeli-
hood, would no longer apply. The problem of theory absorption has been pointed out by
Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972) and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004).
The latter especially focus on theories which can be absorbed by boundedly rational de-
cision makers, distinguishing between partial (some but not all players are aware of the
theory) and full theory absorption.
The guessing game (ﬁrst introduced by Keynes (1936)) has several attractive characteris-
tics for studying rationality and learning: it does not confound eﬀects of rationality with
1the eﬀects of social preferences, such as inequality aversion, fairness, or reciprocity. Addi-
tionally, the guessing game is interactive, has a clear economic interpretation, and is very
simple to explain. It therefore represents an excellent framework to tackle our research
objective, namely, experimentally test theory absorption by boundedly rational decision
makers. We will now discuss the equilibrium theory absorption for guessing games.
In a guessing game all n(≥ 1) players i = 1,...,n have to choose a number gi ∈ [L,H]







with p ∈ (0,1) and d ≥ 0, wins a previously ﬁxed price (Nagel (1995), Duﬀy and Nagel
(1997), Ho et al. (1998), Weber (2003)). Equilibria can be derived by commonly known
iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Clearly, once all players know that all players
know...that all players are aware of this principle and capable of deriving its implications,
they are able to foresee its unique equilibrium prediction. For guessing games this illustrates
full absorbability of strategic equilibria when the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality holds. To illustrate partial theory absorption assume that just one of n ≥ 2
players is aware of the principle of iterated elimination of dominated strategies and able
to apply it. Obviously, such a player i will not use a dominated strategy and account for
the eﬀect of her own choice gi on the target number g∗, but will she rely on her unique
equilibrium strategy? Experience and experimental evidence (Nagel (1999))) suggest that
this is not a best response to what others, more or less unaware of the theory, actually
choose.
Unlike in other games (Roth (1995))) the experimental tests of guessing games (Camerer
et al. (2001), Camerer (2003a), Friedman and Cassar (2004), Nagel (1995) or Nagel (1999))
all reveal convergence of behavior to equilibrium, with the debate basically concerning what
induces faster convergence. Whether this relies on cognitively capturing of the principle of
iteratively eliminating dominated strategies (further on referred to as PIEDS) or on non-
cognitive ideas of behavioral adaptation, such as the application of individual heuristics or
e.g. mental representation (Camerer (2003b), Sbriglia (2006)), thus far remains unclear.
Nagel, in her seminal paper, suggested “...that the reference point or starting point for
the reasoning process is 50 and not 100. The process is driven by iterative, naïve best
replies rather than by an elimination of dominated strategies.” (Nagel (1995)) Iterative
naïve best replies assume that, at each level, every player believes that she is exactly
one level of reasoning deeper than all other players. A level-0 player chooses a number
2randomly in the given interval [0,100] with the mean being 50. Therefore, a level-1 player
gives best reply to the belief that everybody else is level-0 and, thus, chooses p ∗ 50.
Following this line of reasoning a level-2 player chooses p2 ∗ 250, a level-k player chooses
pk ∗ 50, and so on. A player who takes inﬁnite steps of reasoning and believes that all
players take (inﬁnite-1) steps chooses 0, reaching the equilibrium. This interpretation
of the convergence pattern towards the equilibrium implies that diﬀerent subjects are
characterized by diﬀerent cognitive levels.
Bosch-Doménech et al. (2002) analyzed ’newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments’
and categorized subjects according to their depth of reasoning. The authors recognized
that subjects were actually clustered at level-1, level-2, level-3 and level-inﬁnity as assumed
by Rosemarie Nagel. All these results apply to the standard p-beauty contest game.
Camerer et al. (2003) introduced a simple cognitive hierarchy model of games. The model
predicts players are unlikely to play Nash strategies which are reﬁned away by subgame or
trembling-hand perfection. Instead, players assume certain members of their group to stop
the iteration process with a proportion given by a Poisson distribution with the mean τ,
indicating the average number of thinking steps. The main contribution of the paper is to
show that the same model can explain limited equilibration in dominance-solvable games
(like p-beauty contests).
Güth et al. (2002) proposed a game where d was initially set equal to zero and subsequently
equal to 50. This allowed them to analyze the p-beauty contest from a diﬀerent perspective,
comparing, among other things, interior and boundary equilibria. They showed that “...in-
terior equilibria trigger more equilibrium-like behavior than boundary equilibria”. Thus,
convergence towards the equilibrium is faster if the equilibrium is interior. Morone and
Morone (2007) generalized the iterative naïve best replies strategy to the wider class of
games with interior equilibria and analyze Güth et al’s results concerning the properties
of interior equilibria in a more general setting. The iterative naïve best replies strategy is
compared to the iterative elimination of dominated strategies for the generalized p-beauty
contest. They showed that Güth et al’s result is compatible with Nagel’s theory of bounded
rational behavior.
Opposed to the previous experiments, we analyze just the ﬁrst period choices of diﬀerent
guessing games, varying both parameters p and d. The contribution of this paper is to
3verify an immediate change in choice behavior, rather than convergence processes, when
subjects are aware of PIEDS. We will illustrate that these subjects reﬂect on own and other
subjects’ behavior and, furthermore, adapt the theoretical choice predictions of PIEDS to
the anticipated choices of boundedly rational interaction partners. Thus, we show that the
notion of cognitive deliberation and adaptation are essential aspects of theory absorption,
where the level of adaptation determines the level of absorbability.
In section 2 we discuss partial and full theory absorption for guessing games in more
detail. Our experiment (section 3) distinguishes three treatments, diﬀering in the number
(none, some, all) of players in a group who are informed about PIEDS. Whereas these
so-called absorption treatments are explored in a between-subject design, all player groups
experience a variety of guessing games, with boundary (g∗ = L,g∗ = H) and interior
(L < g∗ < H) equilibria in a within-subject design. Section 4 presents the results which
inform our conclusion (section 5).
2 (Iterated) Dominated Strategy Elimination in Guessing
Games
Guessing games are usually presented in a normal form. We concentrate on symmetric





with n as the player number,
gi ∈ Gi = Gi = [L,H]∀i = 1...,n
as the set of strategies of players i satisﬁes 0 ≤ L ≤ H,






















p ∈ (0,1) , d ≥ 0, L < g∗ < H, C as a positive (monetary) endowment and c(> 0) as a
ﬁne that subject i has to pay for deviating from the target number g∗.
4Usually (Nagel (1995)), the payoﬀ is positive only for player i whose guess gi is closest
to the target number g∗. Other studies (Güth et al. (2002), Morone and Morone (2007))
rely on payment schemes where all players can win but are punished according to their
deviation from g∗.
To focus ﬁrst on PIEDS, we discuss the trivial case of being punished for deviating from













With some analytic capability it is easy to compute g∗
1 and to recognize it as the best choice
one can make. Thus, informing the only player 1 about PIEDS should induce the choice
of g∗
1, i.e., the solution principle should be fully absorbable even for boundedly rational
decision makers.
For n ≥ 2 the same principle is applicable and eliminates for all players i = 1,...,n all
numbers gi satisfying
gi <




p(n − 1)H + nd
n − p
.
Such elimination requires no assumption about the others being aware of PIEDS. However,
to derive the unique equilibrium strategies g∗












the following assumptions are required:
• (P.1) All players i = 1,...,n eliminate dominated strategies not just once but repeat-
edly.
• (P.2) All players i = 1,...,n are aware that all players i = 1,...,n know...that all
players i = 1,...,n eliminate iteratively all dominated strategies.
5This shows that guessing games qualify as good candidates for exploring partial and full
absorbability of PIEDS implying the two solution principles (P.1) and (P.2). For example,
when informing only one player of a group about PIEDS, the only thing this player can
conclude is that the strategies gi are dominated, leaving thereby her choice wide open.
When informing all players about PIEDS and guaranteeing the applicability of (P.1) and
(P.2), players should either immediately jump to play g∗ or converge to g∗ very quickly.
In Table 1 we report the nine parameterizations of the three treatments, where p and d
specify the guessing games. It reports the convergence process for the randomly assigned
parameters, starting at 0 or 100, similarly to Güth et al. (2002). The various rows of Table
1 refer to what can be eliminated at each iterative elimination step k, the bottom row
refers to k = ∞ and speciﬁes the equilibrium strategy for the respective game.
Table 1: Nine parameterizations of the guessing game
Number of eliminated strategies
elimination pi = 1/2, d=0 pi = 1/2, d=25 pi = 1/2, d=50 pi = 1/3, d=0 pi = 1/3, d=25 pi = 1/3, d=50 pi = 2/3, d=0 pi = 2/3, d=25 pi = 2/3, d=50
steps fori = 1...8 kisi > fori = 1...8 kisi > fori = 1...8 kisi > fori = 1...8 ki si > fori = 1...8 ki si > fori = 1...8 ki si > fori = 1...8 ki si > fori = 1...8 ki si > fori = 1...8 ki si >
ki in 0 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0 100 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
1.00 0.00 50.00 12.50 62.50 25.00 75.00 0.00 33.33 8.33 41.67 16.67 50.00 0.00 66.67 16.67 83.33 33.33 100.00
2.00 0.00 25.00 18.75 43.75 37.50 62.50 0.00 11.11 11.11 22.22 22.22 33.33 0.00 44.44 27.78 72.22 55.56 100.00
3.00 0.00 12.50 21.88 34.38 43.75 56.25 0.00 3.70 12.04 15.74 24.07 27.78 0.00 29.63 35.19 64.81 70.37 100.00
4.00 0.00 6.25 23.44 29.69 46.88 53.13 0.00 1.23 12.35 13.58 24.69 25.93 0.00 19.75 40.12 59.88 80.25 100.00
5.00 0.00 3.13 24.22 27.34 48.44 51.56 0.00 0.41 12.45 12.86 24.90 25.31 0.00 13.17 43.42 56.58 86.83 100.00
Inﬁnity 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 12.50 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
Game order 7 1 4 5 9 3 2 6 8
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment is performed in three treatments. Each contains nine successive guessing
games with diﬀerent parameters (See table 1 for the sequence of games). In each treatment,
each participant faces all nine games in a within subject-design. The n = 32 subjects
participating in a treatment are subdivided in groups of 8 what yields 4 independent
observations. Subjects have to guess a number within [L,H]. The closer their guesses are
to a target number, the more money they earn, as deﬁned above by u(gi) where C is a
positive (monetary) endowment, and c (> 0) is a ﬁne that subject i has to pay for every
unit of deviation between her guess gi and the target number g∗.
In the ﬁrst treatment (UU), all subjects received instructions with rules on how to play a
guessing game but no information concerning PIEDS. The UU treatment therefore, served
as a control treatment. In the second treatment (UI -partial theory absorption), all subjects
6were provided with the guessing game instructions, and half of them received theoretical
information about how to derive the equilibrium solution. More precisely, “informed”
subjects received detailed information about PIEDS and an illustration of its application1.
Both “informed” and “uninformed” subjects were equally frequent in the groups and knew
how many group members were informed about PIEDS and how many not, thus, inducing
the conditions of partial theory absorption. In the third treatment (II), all subjects were
informed about PIEDS and knew that all subjects had been informed about this principle.
At the beginning subjects were told that they had been matched randomly and that their
group composition would remain the same for the whole experiment. After reading the
instructions a questionnaire ensured the understanding of the basic rules but not of PIEDS.
We only provided feedback about the average of the guessed numbers in each group (where
n = 8) and the personal payoﬀ per round to limit the risk of participants’ reputation seeking
(Camerer et al. (2001)). The changing parameters (Ho et al. (1998)) reduce the possibility
to condition on previous choices.
The experiment was run in April 2006 at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute of Economics in Jena. We used the z-Tree to run the computerized experiments
(Fischbacher (1998)). Ninety-six undergraduate students from Jena University, 32 in each
of the 3 sessions, were recruited to participate in the experiment using the ORSEE software
(Greiner (2004)).2 The average earnings, including a show-up fee of 4 Euros, amounted to
8.41 Euros. A session lasted about 45 minutes.
4 Experiment Results
The experiment aims to test whether PIEDS can be captured cognitively or is adapted non
cognitively, using diﬀerent guessing games. For boundedly rational subjects, absorbing the
1Example: “Any number, chosen by all of the group members wonťt exceed 100. This means, the
average wonťt exceed 100. The average + d (d = 50) times q (here q = 1/3) is 50. Therefore, the number
you should choose, should not exceed 50. If all members of your group will realize this, everybody else
will choose 50 and therefore the average will be 50. Your number should again not exceed the average
+ d times q = 1/3, which is 33.33 in order to earn as much points as possible.” And so on, essentially
explaining table 1.
2All of the 57 female and 39 male students participated at least twice in previous experiments.
7equilibrium prediction is unlikely. We, therefore, compare theoretically perfect strategic
interaction with guesses of boundedly rational subjects in the three treatments.
Analyzing nine diﬀerent guessing games, individual choice behavior is unlikely to be consis-
tent within all games. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the use of the absolute deviations
from equilibria instead of using the concept of thinking depths in order to infer the level of
application of PIEDS. This ﬁts the spirit of the experiment: designing a suitable setting
for testing theory absorption to prevent and discourage qualitative learning 3 in order to
disentangle the possible eﬀects of revealing how to derive the equilibrium.
4.1 General eﬀects of theory absorption
Result 1 Providing subjects with theoretical information about PIEDS leads to smaller
deviations from equilibria, a longer processing time to choose a number and higher proﬁts
in the ﬁrst period as well as in all periods.
The deviations from equilibrium serve as a measure of theory absorption in terms of ac-
ceptability of the theory and the tendency to act according to its equilibrium prediction.
For convenience, we compare the 0.25, 0.5 and the 0.75 quantile aggregates of the nine
period choices per subject instead of the mean. This provides a more robust picture of
actual behavior. To check for general eﬀects we start by comparing UU and II subjects.
Diﬀerences to the UI treatment are examined in more detail in section 4.3.3.
Table 2: First period results of subjects in UU, UI and II, where ∗, 0 and + mark signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (p < 0.05) respective to UU (∗) or UI-U (’) or UI-I (+)subjects
Individual choice devia- Groups’ average choice dev- Time per subject Individual proﬁt
tion from the equilibria iation from the equilibria to choose a guess
Treatment 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75
UU ∗ 9.50 16.50 25.00 16.46 18.25 20.48 21.25 32.50 43.50 0.57 21.05 32.85
UI-U0 13.25 17.50 25.00 9.84 12.53∗ 12.60 21.50 27.50 47.00 2.34 15.70 28.85
UI-I+ 4.50 12.25 19.75 9.84 12.53 12.60 40.75 57.500 71.25 3.55 34.1 40.04
II 0.00 3.50∗+ 15.00 3.66 5.53∗+ 8.06 23.75 45.00∗ 63.00 15.27 39.69∗+ 44.53
3Rosemarie Nagel gives clear evidence for behavioral adjustment toward equilibrium and ascribes it to
qualitative learning, sensitive to changes in the parameters (Nagel (1995)).
8First round choices reﬂect choice behavior undisguised by learning eﬀects and conditioning.
Providing PIEDS has a clear impact as shown by table 2. Subjects of the UU treatment
deviated signiﬁcantly more from the equilibrium than II subjects (p < 0.01)4 Providing
the groups with PIEDS inﬂuenced all group members and thus, the group averages of
UU subjects deviate signiﬁcantly more from the ﬁrst equilibrium than II groups’ averages
(p < 0.01). As revealed by the time usage UU subjects typed in their guesses in signiﬁcantly
less time than II subjects (p < 0.01). Subjects of the UU treatment earned signiﬁcantly less
than II subjects (p < 0.02). This is not obvious since the payment depends on individual
choice distance to the average of a group. In period one UU subjects hold a signiﬁcantly
larger variance of the discrepancy of individual choices to the groups averages (p < 0.02).5
Hence, providing PIEDS has a signiﬁcant impact on subjects’ choice behavior already in
the ﬁrst round. We relate this to the acceptance, application and the trust into others
accepting and applying the guessing game theory.
Eﬀects remained signiﬁcant if all periods are taken into account (see table 4). Subjects of
the UU treatment revealed a higher choice deviation from the equilibria than II subjects
(p < 0.01). The groups’ average choices in the UU treatment deviated more from the
equilibria than II groups’ average choices (p < 0.01). Furthermore, uninformed subjects
(UU) chose their guesses in less time than II subjects (p < 0.01). The disadvantage
of earning less than II subjects prevailed. The informed subjects earned more than UU
subjects during all nine periods (p < 0.01).
Providing subjects with PIEDS induced immediate changes in choice behavior. Thus,
subjects projected the own choice onto the choice of similarly informed group members.
PIEDS and P.1 and P.2 increased trust into the correct diagnose of others’ choice behavior
(Dawes (1988)). The advantage of informed as opposed to uninformed subjects emanate
from the regular application and the trust into others to applicate PIEDS. Since informed
subjects expected more choices to be close to equilibrium the variance of choices in groups
decreased, leading to higher payoﬀs.
4All tests are performed with an asymptotic Wilcoxon signed rank test, exceptions are made explicit.
5UU subjects hold an absolute variance of 286.74 while II subjects deviate signiﬁcantly less from the
group average (85.84)
94.2 Equilibrium behavior
Result 2 Providing PIEDS induces a greater number of equilibrium choices.
To disentangle possible learning eﬀects from immediate theory absorption we analyze how
often subjects use the equilibrium strategy. In the ﬁrst period, II subjects chose the equi-
librium signiﬁcantly more often than UI and UU subjects (p < 0.01, resp. p < 0.01). The
number of ﬁrst period equilibrium hits in the UI treatment did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
the number of UU treatment hits. We relate the high rates of ﬁrst period equilibrium
choices to the large number of students of economy and natural sciences. However, all
informed subjects performed signiﬁcantly (p = 0.011) better than uninformed subjects.
Claiming PIEDS to be fully absorbable would require subjects to follow advice (i.e., elim-
inate strategies until further elimination will not grant higher payoﬀs) and not to deviate
from it, thus, to stick to the theory, being satisﬁed with its predicted outcome. At least
when knowing that all players have been informed about PIEDS (II), one ought to see an
immediate jump to the equilibrium in the ﬁrst and in all periods. This did not prove to
be the case.6
Still, the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in subjects’ behavior among treatments indicate that actors
actually perceive the reﬂexive character of the game theoretic propositions i.e., they can
relate such propositions to the context they are facing. The knowledge of PIEDS induces
them to modify their behavior. The way behavior is modiﬁed depends on the anticipation
of other subjects’ limited absorption capabilities and on mistrust whether participants
appreciate the advice given. These modiﬁcations (the choice deviation from equilibrium)
increased with the decrease of disseminated knowledge.7
Analyzing subjects’ choice behavior over all periods suggests similar conclusions: in the II
treatment, subjects hit the equilibrium signiﬁcantly more often than UI (p < 0.001) and UU
(p = 0.003) treatment subjects. Informing all UI subjects that half of them received just
basic information, while the other half was informed about PIEDS, signiﬁcantly reduced
the overall equilibrium hits when compared to the number of hits in the UU treatment
6In the ﬁrst as well in all periods a binomial test revealed no constant equilibrium choice behavior of
any subjects (p < 0.001).
7Average ﬁrst period choice deviation from equilibrium of II: 5.53, UI: 9.97 and UU: 18.7
10Table 3: Equilibrium choice behavior, where ∗ and 0 mark signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p < 0.05)
to either UU (∗) or UI (0) subjects
period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 total
UU∗ 15.63% 6.25% 6.25% 34.38% 3.13% 21.88% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11%
UI’ 12.50% 3.13% 28.13% 9.38% 6.25% 9.38% 6.25% 6.25% 3.13% 9.38%
II 43.75%∗’ 6.25% 59.38% 40.63% 6.25% 28.13% 9.38% 21.88% 12.50% 25.35%∗’
(p < 0.001). However, within the UI treatment the frequency of equilibrium choices was
signiﬁcantly higher among informed (21 equilibrium hits), as opposed to uniformed (6
equilibrium hits), subjects (p < 0.001).
Of the 432 choices made by the 48 uninformed subjects a total of 38 choices matched the
equilibrium (8.79%). As much as 47.92% of these uninformed subjects failed to achieve a
single equilibrium hit. Of the 48 informed subjects choosing a number in the 9 periods,
there were in total 94 equilibrium hits (21.76%) and only 33.33% of the subjects failed to
choose the equilibrium.
In relation to its frequency in the experiment, interior equilibria had been chosen signiﬁ-
cantly more often than border equilibria (p < 0.001). This indicates that interior solutions
are easier to calculate and is consistent with former ﬁndings (Ho et al. (1998), Güth et al.
(2002)). Diﬀerences in the frequencies of equilibrium choices among treatments can be
seen in Figure 1.
By comparing uninformed and informed subjects’ choices over all treatments, we conclude
that providing PIEDS induces signiﬁcantly more equilibrium choices (p < 0.001). Reject-
ing the hypothesis of equivalent equilibrium choice behavior between the II and the UU
treatment in period one (over all periods) on the 1% (5%) level, suggests the cognitive
capturing of PIEDS as a source of instant changes in choice behavior.
4.2.1 Partial theory absorption
Result 3 Deﬁnite knowledge about the heterogeneous information structure of the group
induces (un)informed UI subject to hold (lower) higher choice deviations from equilibrium,
a (higher) similar time usage and (similar) lower proﬁts than (UU) II subjects.
11Figure 1: frequency of equilibrium hits
Having shown the inﬂuence of PIEDS by comparing the homogeneously (un)informed sub-
jects we now analyze the deviation from these benchmark ﬁndings in the presence of het-
erogeneously informed subjects.
Analyzing period one (see table 2), informed UI subjects deviated signiﬁcantly more from
the equilibrium than II subjects (p < 0.01). On the other hand, ﬁrst period choices of
uninformed UI subjects diﬀered not signiﬁcantly from UU subjects’ choices. Within the
UI treatment both, informed and uninformed subjects, acted similarly. Again, aware of
the presence of uninformed subjects informed UI subjects seemed to have anticipated large
equilibrium deviations of their uninformed group mates and adapted their choices in the
hope to sustain proﬁts. Opposed to this cognitive adaptation, uninformed UI subjects
acted similar to UU subjects. They required the same time to choose a guess. Considering
PIEDS, their informed counterparts needed signiﬁcantly more time to enter their choices
(p < 0.023). Since the informed subjects entered slightly (but not signiﬁcantly) lower
numbers the deviations of UI groups’ averages from equilibrium were signiﬁcantly smaller
than those of UU groups. As a matter of consequence proﬁts of informed UI subjects
were signiﬁcantly smaller than the proﬁts of II subject (p < 0.03). We did not observe
any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between uninformed UI and UU subjects nor between the UI
subjects. Hence, when acting in heterogeneously informed groups subjects in possession
12Table 4: All period results of subjects in UU, UI and II, where ∗, 0 and + mark signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (p < 0.05) respectively to UU (∗), UI-U (0) or UI-I (+)subjects
Individual choice devia- Groups’ average choice dev- Time per subject Individual proﬁt
tion from the equilibria iation from the equilibria to choose a guess
Treatment 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75
UU∗ 8.38 19.9 33.00 11.94 18.50 26.91 16.75 24.00 36.00 0.00 24.57 38.20
UI-U0 8.00 17.00∗ 27.00 10.12 14.58 ∗ 20.91 20.00 32.00 ∗ 52.25 4.83 29.02∗ 39.33
UI-I+ 5.00 14.75 0 25.00 10.12 14.58 20.91 26.00 43.50 0 60.00 9.06 26.86 38.82
II 0.00 10.00∗+ 25.00 7.42 10.96∗+ 18.20 25.00 43.00∗+ 64.00 9.17 30.84∗+ 42.71
of PIEDS anticipated the mental limitations of uninformed group members, changed their
choice behavior but still suﬀered proﬁt losses compared to II subjects.
Table 4 takes all periods into account. We found that uninformed UI subjects - aware
of the presence of informed subjects - deviated from the equilibrium signiﬁcantly less
than if they would in a homogeneously uninformed group (p < 0.02). With no theory
to capture, this shall be a consequence of non-cognitive idea adaptation. Since we found
evidence for this eﬀect only by analyzing nine periods the non-cognitive adaptation seems
to be based on an improvement of the individual heuristics or changes in the mental
representation of outcomes. On the contrary, informed UI subjects were aware that a
cognitive capturing of PIEDS by uninformed UI subjects was unlikely. Thus, partial theory
absorption increased the likelihood of choice deviations from equilibrium, endangering
proﬁts. Therefore, an additional cognitive adaptation of PIEDS’ advises arose, reﬂected
by chosen numbers deviating signiﬁcantly more from the equilibrium than II subjects’
chosen numbers (p < 0.05). In addition, uninformed UI subjects performed worse than
informed UI subjects, in terms of choice deviations from the equilibrium (p < 0.05). We,
therefore, suggest uninformed UI subjects being the driving force behind higher group
average deviations from equilibria of UI subjects compared to II subjects (p < 0.012). Still,
the average deviations from equilibria were less intense than those of the UU groups (p <
0.01). Interestingly uninformed UI subjects needed more time typing in their choices than
UU subjects (p < 0.01).This indicates that knowledge about partial theory distribution
had an impact on the deliberation time of uninformed subjects, prompting them to think
more intensively. Whilst informed UI subjects needed more time than their uninformed
counterparts (p < 0.01) their time consumptions was lower than IIs’ (p < 0.05). While we
found similar proﬁts within the UI treatment, uninformed UI subjects still earned more
13than UU subjects (p < 0.05). However, we observed clear diﬀerences between informed UI
and II subjects (p < 0.05).
While uninformed subjects adapted their choice behavior in mixed groups, without suf-
fering losses (compared to the homogeneous uninformed group), informed subjects carried
the burden of proﬁt losses (compared to II subjects’ proﬁts). The payoﬀ loss of informed
subjects within a mixed informed group can be seen as a consequence of the uncertainty of
uninformed subjects’ choice behavior. Since uninformed UI subjects did not know PIEDS,
we claim the excess time consumption and the smaller choice deviation from equilibrium
compared to UU subjects to be an essentially non-cognitive adaption of behavior.
5 Conclusions
A theory can be considered fully absorbable if all decision makers follow a theory’s advice,
believe all other involved decision makers will do so, not violating assumptions of satisﬁcing
as made by the theory, and will not revise the recommended advise. It is considered as
unilaterally absorbable if just one decision maker is in possession of the theory and the
same assumptions are fulﬁlled. We used PIEDS as a unilateral absorbable theory to solve
the guessing game and tested its application, informing a group not at all (UU), partially
(UI) and fully (II) about it.
Solely providing the basic rules of the guessing game (UU) and mainly neglecting learning
eﬀects a more or less random choice behavior was revealed. Subjects chose numbers signif-
icantly closer to the equilibrium in II groups where PIEDS was explained to all in detail.
Thus, suggesting that boundedly rational II subjects captured the principle and reﬂected
its advises. This capturing and reﬂecting on PIEDS was observed at the very ﬁrst period
and at all periods. However, where we noticed a signiﬁcant impact in terms of frequency of
equilibrium hits, longer processing times, lower group average deviations from equilibrium
and higher proﬁts of II compared to UU subjects, the hypothesis of full theory absorption
(i.e. all subjects stick to the theory, not revise the advise and immediately jump to the
equilibrium) had to be rejected.
To satisfy their proﬁt aspirations II subjects adapted their choices to the expected limita-
tions of bounded rational group members. Thus, we link this to both: a cognitive capturing
of PIEDS and the following cognitive adaptation of the theory’s predictions.
14The knowledge about partial theory absorption decreased trust into UI group members’
mental capabilities. Claiming informed UI subjects being able to capture PIEDS simi-
larly to II subjects, they cognitively adapted its predictions even more in the presence
of uninformed UI subjects in order to sustain proﬁts. On the contrary, uninformed UI
subjects could not reﬂect PIEDS but the presence of informed subjects in an essentially
non-cognitive way. Consequently, they changed signiﬁcantly their choice behavior. Com-
pared to UU subjects, uninformed UI subjects required more time to deliberate and chose
numbers closer to the equilibria if tracked over all periods. Therefore, the UI group averages
deviated less from equilibria than UU group averages.
Hence, we link the partial absorption of PIEDS to a combination of non-cognitive ideas
adaptation by uninformed subjects and cognitive alternations of the captured principle by
informed subjects. The degree to which the theory’s predictions are alternated depends
on the level of known information dissemination. Clearly, in ex-ante partially informed
groups, trust into the capabilities of cognitive capturing PIEDS is smaller than in fully
informed groups. In those the slightest mistrust in the capturing capabilities - as it is
natural in a bounded rational world - leads to revisions of PIEDS’ predictions, thus to a
violation of the assumptions of full theory absorption.
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186 Appendix
6.1 Instructions for the II treatment
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation.
You are a member of a group consisting of eight persons. All group members have the
same instructions like you. Each person of your group has to choose a number between
0 and 100 where 0 and 100 are possible as well. You can choose each number you like.
Please note, that numbers with more than 2 decimals are excluded. The chosen numbers
of your group members will remain unknown to you.
You can earn points in each round. Your payoﬀ depends on how close your number is to a
modiﬁcation of the groups’ average (target number). The closer your number is to a target
number the higher is your payoﬀ in points.
You can calculate you payoﬀ in points this way:






your chosen number −
targetnumber
z }| {







At the begin of each round all group members choose a number simultaneously . The target
number (modiﬁcation of the average) is q times the average of your group members choices.
example:
• x1 = your chosen number
19• x2 = the number chosen by the 2nd group member
• x3 = the number chosen by the 3rd group member
• x4 = the number chosen by the 4th group member
. . .
• x8 = the number chosen by the 8th group member
The average is determined by: x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8
8
The target number is deﬁned as: q*(average+d)
where q and d may vary during the experiment. Both variables are presented to you on
the screen before each round.
The diﬀerence between your chosen number and the target number might be bigger or
smaller than zero. All what matters is the distance, that’s why we take the absolute value
of this diﬀerence.
Therefore, the distance is alway positive and determined by |your chosen number − target number|
Your payoﬀ per round is: 50 points − 2,5 ∗ distance
All explanations are summarized in the following formula:














If the distance time 2.5 is bigger than 50 you will still receive 0 points. You might not earn
additional points but you will never loose points.
20At the end of each round you will receive information about your chosen number, the target
number and your earnings.
After 9 periods the experiment ends and you’ll receive recapitulating information about
your payoﬀs. Payoﬀs are accumulated over all rounds and paid privately in cash. The
transaction course is 1 point = 2 Cent
additional tips:
1. To earn as many points as possible, you’ve got to guess which number is equal to
q ∗ average + d of all chosen numbers. Choose this number.
2. Any number, chosen by all of the group members won’t exceed 100. This means, the
average won’t exceed 100. The average+d (here d = 50) times q (here q = 1/3) is
50. Therefore, the number you should choose, should not exceed 50.
3. If all members of your group will realize this, everybody else will choose 50 and
therefore, the average will be 50. Your number should again not exceed the average
+ d (100) times q = 1/3, which is 33.33 in order to earn as much points as possible.
4. If, again, all members of your group will realize this, everybody else will choose 33.33,
therefore the average will be 33.33. Your number should again not exceed the average
+ d (83.33) times q = 1/3, which is 27.77 in order to earn as much points as possible.
etc., etc.
5. If you and every group member will think this way, everybody will realize that the
optimal number to be chosen is 25. This number will ensure the maximum payoﬀ of
0.5 Ă per round.
Remember, all group members received these additional tips. All know as well, that all
received these tips.
Please answer some controll questions before starting the experiment. This ensures the
understanding of the rules of this experiment. Please remain seated during all the time.
21If you have questions, please raise your hand. Your question will be answered privately .
Please wait for further instructions at the end of the experiment!
controll questionnaire
Assume, you chose 24, the other group members chose 21, 66, 100, 91, 73 and 23.
1. Calculate the average.
2. What is the target number if q = 2/3 and d = 0 ?
3. How big is the distance to your number?
Assume, you chose 54, the average of what the other group members chose is 78.
1. Calculate the average including your number.
2. What is the target number if q = 2/3 and d = 0?
3. How much would you earn if q = 2/3 and d = 25?
In the previous round the parameter had been d = 0 and q = 1/3. Now, d = 50 and
q = 1/3. What phrase you consider to be true?
1. The groups’ average plus d increases.
2. The target number decreases.
3. No statement possible.
226.2 Instructions for the UU treatment
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation.
You are a member of a group consisting of eight persons. All group members have the
same instructions like you. Each person of your group has to choose a number between
0 and 100 where 0 and 100 are possible as well. You can choose each number you like.
Please note, that numbers with more than 2 decimals are excluded. The chosen numbers
of your group members will remain unknown to you.
You can earn points in each round. Your payoﬀ depends on how close your number is to a
modiﬁcation of the groups’ average (target number). The closer your number is to a target
number the higher is your payoﬀ in points.
You can calculate you payoﬀ in points this way:





your chosen number −
targetnumber
z }| {







At the begin of each round all group members choose a number simultaneously . The target
number (modiﬁcation of the average) is q times the average of your group members choices.
example:
• x1 = your chosen number
• x2 = the number chosen by the 2nd group member
23• x3 = the number chosen by the 3rd group member
• x4 = the number chosen by the 4th group member
. . .
• x8 = the number chosen by the 8th group member
The average is determined by: x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8
8
The target number is deﬁned as: q*(average+d)
where q and d may vary during the experiment. Both variables are presented to you on
the screen before each round.
The diﬀerence between your chosen number and the target number might be bigger or
smaller than zero. All what matters is the distance, that’s why we take the absolute value
of this diﬀerence.
Therefore, the distance is alway positive and determined by |your chosen number − target number|
Your payoﬀ per round is: 50 points − 2,5 ∗ distance
All explanations are summarized in the following formula:















If the distance time 2.5 is bigger than 50 you will still receive 0 points. You might not earn
additional points but you will never loose points.
At the end of each round you will receive information about your chosen number, the target
number and your earnings.
24After 9 periods the experiment ends and you’ll receive recapitulating information about
your payoﬀs. Payoﬀs are accumulated over all rounds and paid privately in cash. The
transaction course is 1 point = 2 Cent
Remember,all of your group members have the same information like you. All know as
well, that all received the same information.
Please answer some controll questions before starting the experiment. This ensures the
understanding of the rules of this experiment. Please remain seated during all the time.
If you have questions, please raise your hand. Your question will be answered privately .
Please wait for further instructions at the end of the experiment!
6.3 Instructions for the UI treatment / informed subjects
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation.
You are a member of a group consisting of eight persons. All group members have the
same instructions like you. Each person of your group has to choose a number between
0 and 100 where 0 and 100 are possible as well. You can choose each number you like.
Please note, that numbers with more than 2 decimals are excluded. The chosen numbers
of your group members will remain unknown to you.
You can earn points in each round. Your payoﬀ depends on how close your number is to a
modiﬁcation of the groups’ average (target number). The closer your number is to a target
number the higher is your payoﬀ in points.
You can calculate you payoﬀ in points this way:





your chosen number −
targetnumber
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At the begin of each round all group members choose a number simultaneously . The target
number (modiﬁcation of the average) is q times the average of your group members choices.
example:
• x1 = your chosen number
• x2 = the number chosen by the 2nd group member
• x3 = the number chosen by the 3rd group member
• x4 = the number chosen by the 4th group member
. . .
• x8 = the number chosen by the 8th group member
The average is determined by: x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8
8
The target number is deﬁned as: q*(average+d)
where q and d may vary during the experiment. Both variables are presented to you on
the screen before each round.
The diﬀerence between your chosen number and the target number might be bigger or
smaller than zero. All what matters is the distance, that’s why we take the absolute value
of this diﬀerence.
Therefore, the distance is alway positive and determined by |your chosen number − target number|
26Your payoﬀ per round is: 50 points − 2,5 ∗ distance
All explanations are summarized in the following formula:













If the distance time 2.5 is bigger than 50 you will still receive 0 points. You might not earn
additional points but you will never loose points.
At the end of each round you will receive information about your chosen number, the target
number and your earnings.
After 9 periods the experiment ends and you’ll receive recapitulating information about
your payoﬀs. Payoﬀs are accumulated over all rounds and paid privately in cash. The
transaction course is 1 point = 2 Cent
additional tips:
1. To earn as many points as possible, youťve got to guess which number is equal to
q ∗ average of all chosen numbers. Choose this number.
2. Any number, chosen by all of the group members wonťt exceed 100. This means, the
average wonťt exceed 100. The average times q is 66,67 if q = 2/3. Therefore the
number you should choose, should not exceed 66,67.
3. If all members of your group will realize this, everybody else will choose 66,67 and
therefore the average will be 66,67. Your number should again not exceed the average
times q = 2/3, which is 44,45 in order to earn as much points as possible.
4. If again all members of your group will realize this, everybody else will choose 44,45,
therefore the average will be 44,45. Your number should again not exceed the average
times q = 2/3, which is 29.63 in order to earn as much points as possible. etc., etc.
275. If you and every group member will think this way, everybody will realize that the
optimal number to be chosen is 0. This number will ensure the maximum payoﬀ of
0.5 Ă per round.
Out of you group 4 subjects (including you) received the instructions and these additional
tips. The four remaining group members know just the instructions but not the additional
tips. All persons of your group know as well, that there are four members holding addi-
tional information and four knowing just the basic instructions.
Please answer some controll questions before starting the experiment. This ensures the
understanding of the rules of this experiment. Please remain seated during all the time.
If you have questions, please raise your hand. Your question will be answered privately .
Please wait for further instructions at the end of the experiment!
6.4 Instructions for the UI treatment / uninformed subjects
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation.
You are a member of a group consisting of eight persons. All group members have the
same instructions like you. Each person of your group has to choose a number between
0 and 100 where 0 and 100 are possible as well. You can choose each number you like.
Please note, that numbers with more than 2 decimals are excluded. The chosen numbers
of your group members will remain unknown to you.
You can earn points in each round. Your payoﬀ depends on how close your number is to a
modiﬁcation of the groups’ average (target number). The closer your number is to a target
number the higher is your payoﬀ in points.
28You can calculate you payoﬀ in points this way:





your chosen number −
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At the begin of each round all group members choose a number simultaneously . The target
number (modiﬁcation of the average) is q times the average of your group members choices.
example:
• x1 = your chosen number
• x2 = the number chosen by the 2nd group member
• x3 = the number chosen by the 3rd group member
• x4 = the number chosen by the 4th group member
. . .
• x8 = the number chosen by the 8th group member
The average is determined by: x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8
8
The target number is deﬁned as: q*(average+d)
where q and d may vary during the experiment. Both variables are presented to you on
the screen before each round.
The diﬀerence between your chosen number and the target number might be bigger or
smaller than zero. All what matters is the distance, that’s why we take the absolute value
of this diﬀerence.
29Therefore, the distance is alway positive and determined by |your chosen number − target number|
Your payoﬀ per round is: 50 points − 2,5 ∗ distance
All explanations are summarized in the following formula:













If the distance time 2.5 is bigger than 50 you will still receive 0 points. You might not earn
additional points but you will never loose points.
At the end of each round you will receive information about your chosen number, the target
number and your earnings.
After 9 periods the experiment ends and you’ll receive recapitulating information about
your payoﬀs. Payoﬀs are accumulated over all rounds and paid privately in cash. The
transaction course is 1 point = 2 Cent
Out of your group all eight members (including you) received these basic instructions. But
four group members (not you) received additional information concerning the course of the
game (tips). All subjects know as well, that there are four members holding additional
information and four knowing just the basic instructions.
Please answer some controll questions before starting the experiment. This ensures the
understanding of the rules of this experiment. Please remain seated during all the time. If
you have questions, please raise your hand. Your question will be answered privately . At
the end of the experiment please wait for further instructions!
30